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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Michael G. Long appeals from the district court's appellate order reversing 
the dismissal of misdemeanor charges of recreational trespass and unlawful 
possession of wildlife. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
The state charged Long with recreational trespassing by hunting on 
posted lands and unlawful possession of wildlife. (R., pp. 4, 49-50.) The trial 
court concluded that signs saying "no hunting" were not of like meaning to signs 
saying "no trespassing," and therefore Long was not guilty of recreational 
trespass when he ignored the "no hunting" signs and hunted on private land. 
(Trial Tr., p. 213, L. 8 - p. 219, L. 19.) The state appealed the decision to the 
district court. (R., pp. 102-03.) The district court reversed, concluding that for 
purposes of the recreational trespass statute, a "no hunting" sign was a "notice[] 
of like meaning" to a "no trespassing" sign for purposes of keeping hunters off 
posted property. (R., pp. 153-61.) Long filed a notice of appeal from the district 
court's appellate decision. (R. pp. 163-65.) 
1 
ISSUES 
Long states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Whether it was error to affirm the dismissal of the 
misdemeanor charge from the bench in the presence of the 
defendant and subsequently, two days later, file a written 
decision reversing the magistrate's dismissal of the charge. 
2. Whether it was error to hold that a "No Hunting" sign is of 
like meaning to a "No Trespassing" sign under I.C. Section 
36-1603(a) Recreational Trespass when it is not a sign of 
like meaning under I.C. Section 18-7008 Trespass. 
3. Whether it was error to hold that failure to depart from 
property upon being notified is not an essential element of a 
violation of I.C. Section 36-1603 Recreational Trespass. 
(Appellant's brief, p. 5.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Long failed to show that an oral ruling on appeal may never be 
reconsidered? 
2. Has Long failed to show that a "no hunting" sign is not a notice of "like 
meaning" to a "no trespassing" sign for preventing recreational 
trespasses? 
3. The recreational trespass statute provides that "[n]o person shall enter" 
posted real property to hunt. It also provides that "[n]o person shall fail to 
depart" private property when requested to by the land owner or his agent. 
Is Long's argument that both of these things must occur before 




Long Has Failed To Show That An Oral Ruling On Appeal May Never Be 
Reconsidered 
A. Introduction 
At the conclusion of oral arguments on the initial appeal the district court 
orally stated that the magistrate erred, but that it would affirm the magistrate on 
the alternative ground that the recreational trespass statute was civil only, and 
did not define a crime. (Tr., p. 18, L. 11 - p. 21, L. 9.) However, in its written 
opinion the district court stated that after oral argument it had read a statute that 
stated violations of Title 36 (in which both charged offenses are found) are 
misdemeanors unless otherwise designated. (R., pp. 155, 160 (citing I.C. § 36-
1401 (b)).) It then held that the magistrate had erred and reversed and 
remanded. (R., pp. 153-61.) 
Long argues that the district court lacked the authority to reverse its oral 
appellate ruling. (Appellant's brief, pp. 5-10.) This argument is meritless. 
Application of the relevant law shows that the district court had jurisdiction to 
correct, in its written opinion, an incorrect oral pronouncement. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate 
appellate capacity, the reviewing court "directly review[s] the district court's 
decision." State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App. 
2008) (citing Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008)). If the 
district court properly applied the law to the facts the appellate court will affirm 
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the district court's order. See ~ (citing Losser, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758; 
Nicholls v. Blaser, 102 Idaho 559, 633 P.2d 1137 (1981 )). 
Whether a court has jurisdiction is a question of law, given free review. 
State v. Kavaiecz, 139 Idaho 482, 483, 80 P.3d 1083, 1084 (2003). 
C. The District Court Had Jurisdiction To Correct An Incorrect Oral 
Pronouncement With Its Written Opinion 
Chapter 14 of Title 36 of the Idaho Code is entitled "General Penal 
Provisions." In that chapter the legislature has stated that a person who violates 
"the provisions of this title" is "guilty of a misdemeanor" unless the "offense is 
expressly declared to be an infraction or felony." I.C. § 36-1401 (b). Thus, 
violation of the recreational trespass statute, I.C. § 36-1603, is a misdemeanor 
and possession of an unlawfully taken deer, I.C. § 36-502(b), is also a 
misdemeanor as both are violations of the provisions of Title 36 not otherwise 
declared felonies or infractions. 
Long does not dispute that the district court correctly read and applied I.C. 
§ 36-1401(b) in its written opinion and agrees that the violations he was accused 
of are misdemeanors as a matter of law. (Appellant's brief, pp. 9 ("Assuming, 
without conceding that the district court's post dismissal order changing its 
interpretation of the law is correct .... "), 10 ("Long was charged with 'Recreational 
Trespass', a misdemeanor, under I.C. § 36-1603(a)").) He argues instead that 
the district court's erroneous oral ruling that the acts were not criminal is not 
subject to correction either in the district court or on appeal to this Court. Long's 
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argument is meritless because the district court had jurisdiction to correct its oral 
ruling, and even if it did not this Court is bound to make a correct ruling. 
Generally a court's jurisdiction ends once an appealable order becomes 
final. State v. Hartwig, 150 Idaho 326, 329, 246 P.3d 979, 982 (2011 ); State v. 
Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352, 355, 79 P.3d 711, 714 (2003). Here the district court's 
oral ruling never became a final, appealable order because it was not reduced to 
writing and stamped as filed by the court clerk. See I.A. R. 14(a) (appeals must 
be filed within "42 days from the date evidenced by the filing stamp of the clerk of 
the court on any ... order of the district court appealable as a matter of right .... "). 
Only the written order became a final order. Because it was of an interlocutory 
nature, the district court had jurisdiction to reconsider and ultimately reverse its 
oral ruling. 
Even if the oral ruling had been reduced to writing, making it a final and 
appealable order, the district court still had authority to reconsider its appellate 
ruling at any time before it issued its remittitur. I.AR. 38(b) (appellate opinions 
"become final 21 days" after issuance if there are no further appellate 
proceedings). See also I.AR. 42 (allowing for petition for rehearing on appeal); 
I.C.R. 54.18 (providing that appellate rules generally apply in appeals to the 
district court). Under the applicable legal standards the district court clearly had 
jurisdiction to reconsider and correct its erroneous oral ruling. 
Finally, this Court certainly has authority to make a correct ruling even if 
the district court could not correct its error. It is well established that the 
appellate court will make a correct ruling regardless of the analysis employed by 
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a lower court. See State v. White, 102 Idaho 924, 925, 644 P.2d 318, 319 (1982) 
("This Court has held that where a ruling is correct it is immaterial that the reason 
given by the trial court for admitting the evidence may have been incorrect."); 
State v. Morris, 119 Idaho 448, 450, 807 P.2d 1286, 1288 (Ct. App. 1991) (on 
appellate review, the lower court's ruling must be upheld if it is capable of being 
upheld on any theory). If recreational trespass and possession of unlawfully 
taken game are misdemeanors, this Court is required to so hold on appeal. This 
Court is not bound by an erroneous holding by a lower court where this Court has 
jurisdiction to reach the question. Because there was an appeal timely from the 
district court's order, this Court has jurisdiction over the question of whether the 
charged conduct is criminal and must decide that question correctly. 
Long has failed to show that the district court was powerless to correct an 
obviously incorrect legal ruling orally made and not yet final. To the contrary, the 
district court was well within its power to make a correct ruling. Even if the 
district court were for some reason without power to correct the error, this Court 
is well within its power to affirm the correct ruling that violations of the 
recreational trespass and possession of unlawfully taken game statutes are 
misdemeanors. 
11. 
Long Has Failed To Show That A "No Hunting" Sign Did Not Provide Him With 
Statutory Notice That He Was Trespassing If He Hunted On The Posted Property 
A. Introduction 
The magistrate held that a "no hunting" sign was not a "notice[] of like 
meaning" to a "no trespassing" sign or orange paint. (Trial Tr., p. 213, L. 8 - p. 
6 
219, L. 19.) The district court held that, in the context of providing notice to 
hunters that they would be trespassing if hunting en designated land, a "no 
hunting" sign did provide statutory notice. (R., pp. 156-60.) 
Long argues that the "no hunting" signs did not give statutory notice for 
two reasons. First, he argues that under the statute landowners must exclude all 
persons or none, and that preventing access to only hunters is therefore not 
allowed (and "could be argued to be harassment of a person engaged in the 
lawful taking of wildlife"). (Appellant's brief, pp. 13-15.) Second, Long attempts 
to raise for the first time on appeal the claim that the evidence was inadequate 
because it does not establish that the "no hunting" signs were posted every 660 
feet. (Appellant's brief, pp. 14-15.) Neither of these arguments has merit. To 
the contrary, application of the correct legal standards shows that the district 
court properly reversed the magistrate's holding. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate 
appellate capacity, the reviewing court "directly review[sJ the district court's 
decision." State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App. 
2008) (citing Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008)). If the 
district court properly applied the law to the facts the appellate court will affirm 
the district court's order. See~ (citing Losser, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758; 
Nicholls v. Blaser, 102 Idaho 559, 633 P.2d 1137 (1981 )). 
The construction and application of a statute are questions of law over 
which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Locke, 149 Idaho 641, 
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642, 239 P.3d 34, 35 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing State v. Reyes, 139 Idaho 502, 505, 
80 P.3d 1103, 1106 (Ct. App. 2003)); State v. Scott, 135 Idaho 457, 458-59, 19 
P.3d 771, 772-73 (Ct. App. 2001). 
C. A "No Hunting" Sign Gives Statutory Notice That Hunting On The Property 
Will Be Considered Trespass 
The interpretation of a statute must begin with the literal words of that 
statute. State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003). Those 
words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning and the statute 
must be construed as a whole. .!fl "Where the language of a statute is plain and 
unambiguous, [the appellate court] must give effect to the statute as written, 
without engaging in statutory construction." State v. Locke, 149 Idaho 641, 642, 
239 P.3d 34, 35 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462, 988 
P.2d 685, 688 (1999); State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 659, 978 P.2d 214, 219 
(1999); State v. Escobar, 134 Idaho 387, 389, 3 P.3d 65, 67 (Ct. App. 2000)). 
Here the language of the statute is plain. One element of the recreational 
trespassing statute is that the property is posted with "legible 'No Trespassing' 
signs," "a minimum of one hundred (100) square inches of fluorescent orange 
paint," or "other notices of like meaning." I.C. § 36-1603(a). This plain language 
provides that landowners may restrict access to their real property by providing 
notice that coming on to the property will be considered trespass. Nothing in the 
language supports the concept that the landowner may not restrict access for 
some types of activities while allowing others. A landowner under this statute 
may allow hikers, or bird watchers, or geocachers, but prohibit hunters. Posting 
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a "no hunting" sign is merely a specific and limited no trespassing notice that 
clearly notifies any person that if he engages in hunting on that property he is 
trespassing, while allowing access to the property for other purposes. Because a 
"no hunting" sign is merely a specialized no trespassing notice, it is a "notice[] of 
like meaning" to a general no trespassing sign under the plain language of the 
statute. 
Long argues that the statute limits a landowner's ability to exclude only 
hunters, and that if the landowner excludes hunters he must exclude all others 
not granted specific permission from his property, because hunting is a right and 
excluding only hunters is like harassment. (Appellant's brief, pp. 13-15.) There 
is nothing in the language of the statute that suggests that landowners may not 
single out hunting as a disallowed activity on their land. To the contrary, a "no 
hunting" sign is a proper notice that those engaged in the prohibited activity, 
hunting, are trespassing. Because a "no hunting" sign is a specific notice that 
anyone engaged in hunting is trespassing, it is a "notice[] of like meaning" to a 
general "no trespassing" sign. 
D. Long's Claim That The Signs Did Not Otherwise Meet Statutory 
Requirements Is Without Merit 
Long also argues for the first time on this second appeal that the signs 
were not placed "every 660 feet as required by statute." (Appellant's brief, pp. 
14-15.) This argument is meritless. 
First, this argument fails for lack of sufficient record for review. On appeal, 
the appellant bears the burden of presenting a sufficient record to evaluate the 
g 
merits of the challenge. State v. Mowrey, 128 Idaho 804, 805, 919 P.2d 333, 334 
(1996); Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 648, 873 P.2d 898, 902 (Ct. App. 1994). 
Here the state presented exhibits detailing the location of the no hunting signs. 
(Trial Tr., p. 32, L. 14 - p. 34, L. 23; p. 46, L. 22 - p. 47, L. 4; p. 51, L. 6 - p. 72, 
L. 3 (referencing State's Exhibits 1-6, 8).) Long has failed to include those 
exhibits in the record. (R., p. 168.) His claim that the evidence does not support 
a conclusion that the signage was adequate is barred by an inadequate record. 
Even if not barred, Long's argument is irrelevant. The statute provides 
that signs must be placed every 660 feet "provided that where the geographical 
configuration of the real property is such that entry can reasonably be made only 
at certain points of access, such property is posted sufficiently for all purposes of 
this subsection if said ... notices are posted at such points of access." I.C. § 36-
1603(a). The state presented evidence that the no hunting signs were posted at 
the only reasonable points of access to the property. (Trial Tr., p. 34, Ls. 21-23; 
p. 47, L. 20 - p. 52, L. 21; p. 115, Ls. 9-22; p. 139, Ls. 6-16.) The evidence was 
that to access the area where he hunted Long had to walk past two no hunting 
signs. (Trial Tr., p. 47, L. 20- p. 52, Ls 21; p. 61, L. 10-p. 63, L. 19.) Long's 
argument about the distance between signs is irrelevant because the state 




Long Has Faiied To Show That Oral Or Vvritten Notification Is A Necessary 
Element Of Recreational Trespass In This Case 
Long argues that to be convicted of recreational trespass the state must 
prove both that the defendant entered posted property and also failed to depart 
when specifically requested. (Appellant's brief, pp. 15-17.) This argument is 
contrary to the plain language of the statute. 
The first subsection of the recreational trespass statute contains three 
sentences. The first sentence provides that "[n]o person shall enter" posted or 
cultivated property to hunt without permission. The second sentence provides a 
definition of "cultivated." The third sentence provides that "[11]0 person shall fail 
to depart" property upon notification of the owner or his agent. I.C. § 36-1603(a). 
The plain language of this subsection creates two separate potential criminal 
actions: entering posted property and failing to leave after being instructed to do 
so. Long's argument that both actions are required to constitute a single crime of 
recreational trespass is meritless. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the appellate holding of 
the district court. 
DATED this 6th day of December, 2011. 
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